Bangladesh Crisis and the Great Powers

Bangladesh Crisis and the Great Powers

Soviets Union’s Action

After the military crackdown in East Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan was under international pressure to stop the massacre and to respond to the legitimate demands of the Bengalis. A message was sent to President Yahya Khan on 2 April 1971 by the Soviet Union, President Podgorny warned him that the continuation of repressive measures and blood shedding in East Pakistan would undoubtedly make the solution of the problem more difficult and would do great harm to the vital interest of the entire people of Pakistan. At the very beginning of Bangladesh crises this was the first signal from a big power that it required a political solution. In reply as message to President Podgorny, President Yahya Khan stated that government would fight against anti-nationalist elements, for the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. He further stated that government took the measures to protect the honor, lives, and property of the vast majority of East Pakistani citizens. President Yahya assured Soviet President that his main aim is to transfer the power to the elected representative of the people and with this view he would start talks with rational representative element in East Pakistan.

In December 1970, the Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin sent a message to Yahya Khan congratulating him on the successful completion on the general election in the country and expressed the hope that he will submit his power to the peoples’ representative in a smooth manner. In early June 1971, the Soviet Premier emphasized the need for restoring to peaceful matters for achieving political settlement in Pakistan. Meanwhile a Soviet writer blamed the hawkish General of the Pakistan Army for the use of force in order to crush the popular moment of the Bengalis. The writer was not in the Soviet Union, but writing in the international newspaper on behalf of Soviet expression. Premier further insisted on that if the economic grievances of the East Pakistan were redressed, the two wings of the country, despite their cultural differences, could work together for the prosperity of the whole of Pakistan.

USSR had three approaches while dealing with Bangladesh crisis: Firstly, any encouragement to the secessionist may endanger the presence of the Soviet Union in Pakistan. Secondly, other great powers having keen interest in the region are standing firmly behind the military rulers of Pakistan, in order to counter the balance of Soviet influence. Thirdly, the Soviet Union was neither prepared nor in a position to take the risk of creating a new state. She thought that the break-up of Pakistan could be succession to the other provinces of Pakistan and India. She stood against Pakistan’s membership in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). She had advocated close economic and cultural links with India.

The relationship between Pakistan and India became too bitter. Soviet Union also feared that recognition by India of Pakistan dismemberment would inevitably lead to war between India and Pakistan. President Yahya began to talk about war with India. Secondly, he stated that he was not alone in his fight against India. This statement confirmed the suspicions of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the region (It was also expected that Soviet Union is trying to create its influence over the Asian region), and she became unhappy about the strong support given to Pakistan by People’s Republic of China. At about the same time, the dramatic moves on Sino-American detention came to the forefront and Pakistan played an important role in facilitating the dialogue between the two countries. Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation was signed between Soviet Union and India, to promote Indian interest and objective in South Asia and Soviet Interest and objectives in Asia generally. Soviet Union repeatedly advised President Yahya to seek a political solution which could be acceptable to the Bangladesh Government-in-exile. India also wanted to see the Soviet Union influence on Pakistan, for a political settlement.

United States and Bangladesh Crisis

Yahya Khan sent a delegation to Peking which was headed by Bhutto. On his return from Peking, Bhutto claimed that his visit was a total success and that China would support Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India. Premier Indira Gandhi’s visit to the United States proved to be unproductive as her meeting with Nixon could not bring about any measures. The United States gave no indication of its readiness to influence the Pakistan Government in favor of political settlement in East Pakistan. From the beginning of the Bangladesh crisis, the position of the United States was one of dodging. The President and the State Department took a very cautious and natural attitude. This was so because the United States by the time of Richard Nixon came to White House in January 1969, and decided to lower its profile in Asia. Nixon said while the United States would assuredly honor its treaty commitments, it must avoid making Asian countries so dependent on the United States that the later would be in raged into conflicts, such as the Vietnamese War.

 The role of the United States in Asian countries would be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them. The leaders in United States failed to speak out publicly against the genocide in Bangladesh, or to influence Government of Pakistan to moderate its policies in East Pakistan. The United States Government stated that they were naturally concerned at the reported loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan. United States official sources maintained their silence. The American Senator began to work against the government’s silence and suggested the Administration to stop military aid to Pakistan. A resolution was moved in the Senate on 15th April and in the House of Representative on 17 May for suspension of all military assistance to Pakistan. In fact, no arms had been provided since the beginning of the crisis. United States was unwilling to either sell or grant military assistance for use in civil war.

US desired a political settlement; it also wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The United States Government maintained a double posture - on the one hand, it gave aid for the refugees and on the other, it sustained and backed Pakistani rulers. On 3 August, House of Representative voted to cut off some $424 million in economic aid, military sales and surplus shipment authorized in the previous year and in the 1971 fiscal years program for Pakistan. Nixon said that public pressure on West Pakistan to ease the group of civil turmoil in East Pakistan would be “totally counterproductive”.

Relations between New Delhi and Washington soon began to deteriorate seriously. The reason were obvious – the refusal of Nixon administration to publicly denounce the Pakistani military repression aimed at crushing the independence movement in East Bengal and the Administration’s decision to continue arms shipment to Pakistan. The American government was not in the favor of giving any economic assistance to Pakistan with the resolution of Bangladesh political crisis. For the United States, the main fear was that an isolated Pakistan at the Bay of Bengal would be a war like Pakistan. The danger of war between Pakistan and India which would involve both the Soviet Union and China was a major bee in the bonnet of Washington. It also advised Pakistan Government to stop the refugee flow and to alter the nature of the military government in East Pakistan. And thereby persuade the refugees to come back. The announcement of General Assembly by the Pakistan Government was also made largely on the insistence of the United States. After the opening of western front, Henry Kissinger asked the State Department to cut off aid to India and to ask India for assurances that no part of West Pakistan territory would be annexed by her.

Cooperation with Peoples’ Republic of China

The Chinese reaction to Bangladesh crisis appeared to be extremely confused. On 25th March, the PRC gave Pakistan government its strong support. On 6 April, it accused India of interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. The Indian Government had been hideously interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. This could also be settled by the Pakistani People themselves and no foreign interference, whatsoever was required.  The Chinese government had given clear-cut support to Yahya Regimes in its attempt to crush the Bengali resistance. The problem of unrest was created by the separatist leaders of the Awami League, as perceived by the Chinese Govt. Chinese loans and weapons dispatched to Yahya were in reality a way of sending arms to the resistance. In this way, the Chinese government deliberately aligned itself with the policies pursued by the military rulers of Pakistan against a mass popular rise.

Chinese made; fighter bombers used to fly over the East Bengal. When the Pakistan Government confronted a grave economic crisis by the middle of June 1971, China stepped into the breach with a generous loan of $100 million, free of interest. The highway linking Sinkiang with North-West Pakistan across the Karakorum, from Sufu to Gilgit, was a constant conduit for both the military and civilian supplies to Pakistan throughout the crisis. China neither sent nor received high level delegation to or from Pakistan. The Soviet support to the Indian view of the situation, and its willingness to help India to resolve the crisis got accentuated. Consequently, the Chinese reaction began to change. Bhutto went to Peking for securing substantial aid from the Chinese Government. Bhutto’s visit demonstrated that no significant aid would be given by China.

United Nations in Action

On the international front, the war drew the attention of the big powers. United States sought a meeting at Security Council and initiated a discussion on the crisis. A resolution to cease fire was vetoed down by the Soviet Union. According to the perception of Soviet Union, United States will not intervene militarily in the conflict and the Soviet Union was determined to oppose Chinese intervention. When the Security Council resumed its emergency session there were three drafts resolutions under discussion. One put forward by the Soviet Union called for political settlement of the East Pakistan problem and for Pakistan to cease all acts of violence in the Eastern wing. A second resolution proposed by Belgium, Italy and Japan called for a cease fire but not for a withdrawal of troops. The third, sponsored by Argentina, Burundi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Somalia called simply for a cease fire and Withdrawal without mention of a political settlement or the problem of refugee. Agha Shahi of Pakistan alleged that india had not only launched aggression against Pakistan but had openly demanded that it should dismember itself and give up the territory that contained most of the population.

To break the continued deadlock in Security Council , it was asked to General Assembly to act. It took over the issue and adopted a resolution calling for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistani armed forces to their own sides of borders. The votes were 104 in favor, 11 against and 10 absention. On December 9, Pakistan agreed to accept the UN call for a cease fire and withdrawal of troops. It seemed that for Pakistan, such a resolution provided an easy escape route since it wanted a guarantee of evacuation for West Pakistani army and civilian personnel. India made it clear that its forces are ready to withdraw as soon as they were asked to do so by Bangladesh authorities and it did not have any territorial ambition on the Western Front. When the United States’ resolution was put to vote again on 13 December the Soviet Union exercised its veto for the third time. US State Department gave a Statement and took a side that the US would not involve itself militarily in the subcontinent. But US began to move Units of its powerful naval fleet into the bay of Bengal. The situation was very tense and global conflict seemed to be in the offing. The Pakistani forces were locked in Bangladesh by the movement of the US Seventh fleet towards the Bay of Bengal. On 16 December 1971, Niazi offered to surrender and the instruments of surrender was signed by him and J. S. Aurora at the Dacca Ramna Race Course. This Surrender signaled the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent, sovereign state on the map of the world.

Conclusion

The study of the Fall of Dhaka explained the diplomatic staff and Foreign Office of Pakistan, keeping the interest seeking view in the international politics. Pakistan had no good alliances and neither it seek a political settlement as a way out to the solution of various problems. China supported Pakistan but the military arms and weaponry used in the civil war was the givens of China. US has always seek its interest, but it never affirmed any concern to the Pakistan. A very wise and explained concern was shown by Soviet Union, so we lost the true opinion in the favor of arms and military aid by US. At the end, the bearings of the lost were for Pakistan only.

Bibliography

Bhuriyan, Md. Abdul Wadud. Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League. New Delhi: The University Press Limited; Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD.

 Zaheer, Hassan. The Separation of East Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.